OpenSSH Flaw Lets Attackers Log Into Password-Disabled Linux Accounts
8 72A newly disclosed OpenSSH flaw dubbed "*sshole" can allow attackers to log in to password-disabled accounts on certain musl-based Linux systems simply by submitting a password longer than 256 bytes. "Apparently certain varieties of musl Linux (Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto, etc.) have had this OpenSSH vulnerability for about a decade," writes longtime Slashdot reader AlteredEgg. "Upgrade now!" BleepingComputer reports: Security researcher Ozgun Kultekin, who discovered and released details on the vulnerability today, says the flaw has existed since 2016 and stems from how OpenSSH handles password verification errors on systems using the musl C library. Linux accounts can be configured to prevent password logins by replacing their password hash with an asterisk (*) in the /etc/shadow file. Because this is not a valid password hash, no password should allow access to those accounts. However, a patch introduced in OpenSSH in 2016 to fix a username enumeration vulnerability tracked as CVE-2016-6210 changed how OpenSSH handled accounts without usable password hashes.
To prevent attackers from identifying valid usernames through different response times, OpenSSH was modified to perform password hashing even when an account had no usable password hash, including accounts configured with * to block password logins. The problem is that the musl C library's crypt() function also returns * when password hashing fails, including when a submitted password exceeds its 256-byte limit. This means an attacker can submit an oversized password and cause OpenSSH to compare the returned * against the account's stored *, resulting in a successful login.
To be clear, the flaw does not allow attackers to bypass passwords on accounts with valid password hashes. [...] Admins who can't immediately install the update can mitigate the issue by turning off SSH password authentication with PasswordAuthentication no in their SSH server configuration and restarting SSH. Kultekin says admins can also check for signs of exploitation by examining SSH authentication logs for password-based logins for accounts that should not allow them.
8 comments
Re:UNIX-style passwords (Score: 5, Interesting)
by machineghost ( 622031 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @05:52PM (#66412203)
On Hacker News the headline for a similar article was "AI is forcing us to pay off 40 years of technical debt".
I think that sums it up well. Like you said, it's been known for 20 years ... and yet it's still relevant today. AI is forcing us to deal with our tech debt.
The title seems kind of wrong (Score: 5, Informative)
by ffkom ( 3519199 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @05:13PM (#66412135)
From what I read about this issue, the flaw is more on the side of the musl C library, rather than on OpenSSH's side. (However OpenSSH can defuse the situation by adapting to the unexpected return value from musl.)
Re:The title seems kind of wrong (Score: 5, Insightful)
by Junta ( 36770 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @05:21PM (#66412161)
Yeah, crypt() *should* return a NULL pointer, *not* some arbitrary string when there's a fault. Entirely musl's bug.
Re:The title seems kind of wrong (Score: 5, Insightful)
by Spazmania ( 174582 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @05:53PM (#66412209)
For legacy reasons, Crypt() is not allowed to return a null pointer. Some old applications do not expect a null pointer and will crash. On error, it instead returns a string that starts with *. In GNU C the string starts with * and then has a partial, invalid hash. In Musl C it just has the *. Crypt() never returns * on success.
Check the man page.
Re:The title seems kind of wrong (Score: 5, Informative)
by ffkom ( 3519199 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @07:07PM (#66412323)
I don't know whose man page you refer to, but there is an official standard stating otherwise: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onl... [opengroup.org]
Re:The title seems kind of wrong (Score: 5, Funny)
by Cajun Hell ( 725246 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @09:12PM (#66412457)
I hereby declare that malloc() may not return NULL, due to the fact that nobody ever checks for that, i.e. legacy reasons.
Re:The title seems kind of wrong (Score: 5, Informative)
by Spazmania ( 174582 ) on Friday November 06, 2026 @02:27AM (#66412605)
You're looking at an older copy of the crypt man page. Compare the two from current Debian and Debian from 5 years ago. Current Debian returns a string starting with "*" so that older applications fail closed (as explained in the man page).
https://manpages.debian.org/tr... [debian.org]
https://manpages.debian.org/bu... [debian.org]
Use another character (Score: 5, Interesting)
by whoever57 ( 658626 ) on Thursday November 05, 2026 @05:57PM (#66412215)
Linux accounts can be configured to prevent password logins by replacing their password hash with an asterisk (*) in the /etc/shadow file
I typically use "!" to prevent logins (and change the shell to one of the nologin alternatives, dependent on the exact Linux version).