SystemD's Creator Opens Signups for Private Preview of Amutable's Cryptographically Verified Linux Systems
7 49SystemD creator Lennart Poettering left Red Hat for Microsoft in 2022, but 10 months ago left to co-found Amutable a company that aims to build cryptographically verified Linux systems that stay trusted over time.
It's FOSS calls it "a read-only, image-based system where every machine produces signed reports of its own state" — and signups are now open for a private preview: Before announcing this Linux-based implementation, Amutable had released two open source tools. tine, a Buck2-based build system that composes OS images; available under MPL-2.0, and Quarry, a TUF-based tool that distributes those images to machines; available under Apache-2.0. What Amutable Foundations brings to the table is a service where Amutable runs the images, update repositories, control plane and vulnerability fixes for organizations and individuals who operate their own systems.
No license has been stated for those company-run parts, and the preview announcement does not say how much of Foundations beyond tine and Quarry will be open source. Software and configuration both ship as signed images, and a machine boots only what is signed. Because there is no package manager and no SSH or interactive shell, a change means giving every machine in your fleet a new signed image.
Its images are reproducible, come with a software bill of materials (SBOM) and are built from pinned inputs of whichever distribution you pick, with tine being able to import packages from Fedora or CentOS Stream. Each machine sends a signed report that records what it booted, from the firmware and boot loader up to the kernel and OS, plus the configuration it runs... Amutable's control plane verifies reports from systemd-report, an experimental command in systemd 260 that the company helped build. It compares each one with the declared state and flags machines that deviate. A rollout only continues while machines can show they are in a good state...
Amutable is signup formlooking for teams that manage Linux fleets and need to show what state each machine is in. It expects to start bringing the first 'design partners,' as it calls them, on board over the coming weeks.
7 comments
Seriously, can't this guy just GO THE FUCK AWAY? (Score: 5, Interesting)
by Chromium_One ( 126329 ) on Sunday November 01, 2026 @05:51PM (#66405043)
Fuck Lennart.
Fuck systemd.
and tangentially, fuck Microsoft as well.
You know how long it took after his paws were no longer all over PulseAudio before it got to be halfway stable and usable for daily driving? Both Amutable and Quarry may AT BEST eventually follow that trajectory, but goddamn, systemd is still a gigantic piece of shit that the primary features it provides are 1) a gigantic attack surface, and 2) a great many potential modes of failure. Anything this guy has been involved with should BY DEFAULT be treated with suspicion and the architectural choices beaten on with a hammer.
Re:Seriously, can't this guy just GO THE FUCK AWAY (Score: 5, Funny)
by ebunga ( 95613 ) on Sunday November 01, 2026 @07:58PM (#66405189)
He touched him on the systemd, obviously.
new revenue stream (Score: 5, Insightful)
by robot5x ( 1035276 ) on Sunday November 01, 2026 @06:46PM (#66405113)
this sounds very much like someone sitting down and thinking "... how could I make a thing which nobody wants but requires some centralized signing and distribution layer which I can charge $$$ for".
I mean -
"a change means giving every machine in your fleet a new signed image."
Very much in keeping with Poettering's other work, the ends justify the ends.
Re:new revenue stream (Score: 5, Insightful)
by gr8dude ( 832945 ) on Monday November 02, 2026 @01:16AM (#66405477)
In a closed ecosystem, not sign it with your own key? Only your own devices will be able to verify that signature, and that's fine.
It doesn't have to be centralized in a way like MS Authenticode is (where you need a certificate from a "blessed" CA).
Overcomplicated crap (Score: 5, Informative)
by bubblyceiling ( 7940768 ) on Sunday November 01, 2026 @07:34PM (#66405161)
I am honestly tired of all this abstraction in the name of security. Just adds unnecessary bloat and makes things hard to troubleshoot. UEFI is a prime example. Even after all that it got hacked anyway. Now we just have this another opaque layer of bullshit to deal with.
Keep code simple so users can easily understand what is going on.
It is same story with WebDev. I don't understand what was so hard about JS, that people made all this bullshit like React and Angular. We had jQuery and it was glorious. There was no need to make it the module and import hell it is currently.
Same with PHP. People seem to forget that PHP is a JIT language with some code caching recently being bolted on. Write bare metal code just to serve the dynamic parts of an HTML, is the correct way to use it. There is no need to serve static content via PHP. But people do that everyday with whatever the latest framework is.
Re:Overcomplicated crap (Score: 5, Interesting)
by Arrogant-Bastard ( 141720 ) on Sunday November 01, 2026 @08:31PM (#66405223)
This is an excellent point. I've learned a lot over the decades I've been on the net (and still have a great deal more to learn); one of the most important lessons is this: you don't make things more secure by adding code, you make them more secure by removing code.
The simpler something here the harder it is to make a mistake in its implementation, and the smaller its attack surface. This has always been important but I think there's a fair argument to be made that it's more important than ever now that LLM-driven attacks are a thing. It will be interesting in (let's say) five years to survey all of the LLM-originated vulnerabilities and ascertain what software was most/least susceptible. My guess is that -- as a first-order approximation -- it'll be linear with the number of lines of code.
Trust (Score: 5, Informative)
by CAIMLAS ( 41445 ) on Sunday November 01, 2026 @09:50PM (#66405311)
Are we really going to trust something security-oriented by a guy who conceived of systemd? Instead of creating something which improves security and isolation, he created something renowned for its architectural and management complexity, privilege boundaries (or frequent lackthereof), attack surface, and the frequent consequences of concentrating system management in a large privileged software stack.
I'm reminded of the SSH/Pulse Audio privilege escalation through systemd some years back... due to their obstinately poor security design.